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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
l\1ABEL A. BENCH,
Plain tiff-Appellant,
-vs-

THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
a co;-poration,
'

Case No.
11105

Defendant, Respondent.)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an Appeal from an Order by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff,
as widow and beneficiary, sued Defendant insurance company under group insurance policies issued by Defendant to the deceased' s employer,
Ajax Press Company, 'Nlth two death benefit certificates, a medical benefit certificate and a weekly
indemnity certificaJe issued to deceased.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\f\lER COURT
The case being at issue, at pretrial the Court
directed that certain issues as to one policy, the
$800.00 policy, be disposed of by Motion for Summary Judgment and continued the pretrial (Pretriai
Order paragraph 7 R 42). Plaintiff, in accordance
with leave of Court at pretrial, amended the Complaint asserting two other policies, the weekly indemnity policy and the medical benefits policy and
submitted interrogatories which were never re·
sponded to. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
amended Complaint was granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the Complaint reinstated
for further proceedings in accordance with the pretrial order, including disposition of the legal question poised with reference to the $800.00 policy (No.
5311848), further discovery regarding amounts provided under the $1500.00 policy (No. 0486A), and details of benefits under the other two policies, and
thereafter trial of the issues then remaining.
STA TEMENT OF FACTS
Decedant, Leland E. Bench, died July 1, 1963
after being terminated of his employment April 2G.
1963 by employer, Ajax Press Company. Plaintiff.
the deceased' s widow, claims benefits under certain
life, weekly indemnity and medical benefit groun
insurance policies written by Defendant company.
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Plaintiff claims that decedent was totally disabled
from date of termination until date of death, a condition under one of the policies, and that Defendant
denied liability and refused to disclose certain of
the policies thereby waiving notice and proofs of
loss.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges generally the existance of insurance covering her husband's death and
the refusal of the Defendant to pay thereunder; Defendant's Answer admitted two policies, an $800.00
policy No. 5311848 and a $1500.00 policy No. 0486A
and omitted reference to a policy, Certificate No.
0486W referred to by pretrial order and Certificate
No. 0846-H mentioned for the first time in the Amended Complaint.
As to the two policies admitted, Defendant's
original Answer to the original Complaint admitted
that Plaintiff was beneficiary, denied liability on the
$800.00 policy because of clause excluding payment
where death occurred over thirty-one days from
termination of employment and denied liability on
the $1500.00 policy because of alleged failure of
Plaintiff to submit Proof of Death within a year and
Proof of Disability from date of termination until date
of death.
Interrogatories disclosed notice by Plaintiff to
Defendant "within a week after the death of Mr.
Bench." (R 28)
The record is silent as to details of Defendant's
denial of liability, as to Plaintiff's fulfillment of conditions precedent, as to facts supporting the alleged
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estopple, and the nature of benefits under policies
No. 0486-W and No. 0846-H.
The case being at issue was pretried by Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, the Pre-trial Order detailing that as to the $800.00 po1icy, the effect of its provisions where death occurred more than thirty-days
after termination of employment should be as a_
matter of law determined by Motion for Summary
Judgment. and that as to the $1500.00 policy, a provision for replacement brouqht to light at pretrial
lent doubt as to the amount recoverable in the event
of coverage and that the replaced policy should be
furnished by Defendant.
As to the $1500.00 policy, it was encumbent in
the original Complaint, the Answer thereto, and th0
pretrial order that the only thing to be decided
thereon was first, whether Proof of Death was submitted or necessity thereof waived by denial of liability and second, whether deceased was totally
disabled from the date of termination until death.
Also at pretrial Plaintiff was given leave to
amend to assert liability under certificate No.
0486-W a medical benefits policy not theretofore
disclosed by the pleadings, and the pretrial was
continued, the Court saying:
"The pertrial is continued without date, and may be
renoticed without going to the foot of the pretrial
back-log of cases." (R 42)

By Amended Complaint Plaintiff asserted the
three referred to policies, First Cause of Action, the
$800.00 policy No. 5311848; Second Cause of Action,
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the $1500.00 policy No. 0486-A; Third Cause of Action, the weekly benefits policy No. 0486-W;
Fourth Cause of Action, policy No. 0846-H, a medical
benefits policy; and Fifth Cause of Action assert]ng any other policies.
The Amended Complaint also asserted deceased' s total disability from termil1ation of employment until death, a. reauisite under the $1500.00
policy No. 0486-A, due and required notice under
all of the policies, fulfillment of all conditions precedent, and estopple of Defendant to claim time,
notice, and other defenses.
The record does not, and should have been
made to reveal details of Defendant's denial of payment; also of facts supporting Plaintiff's allegation
of estopple of Defendant to claim policy defenses
and we may assume that Plaintiff's Interrogatories
in the record (R 64), never answered, inquiring as
to Ajax Press officials authorized to act for Defendant company, Interrogatory No. 3, 4, and 9 and
with respect to visits by Plaintiff by Ajax Press personnel concerning insurance benefits, Interrogatory
No. 11, had these interrogatories been answered,
may have supplied particulars that adherence to
the record precludes the writer from commenting
upon.
Defendant moved (R 69) the Court to dismiss
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserting
failure of same to state a cause of action and citinq
Rule 12, the Answers to Interrogatories, the Deposition of Plaintiff and the Affidavit of Larry Blake.
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The District Court granted the Motion to Dismis2
without detailing why nor whether the legcl isstic·
on the $800.00 policy, directed to be disposed of by
the pretrial order, was specifically ruled on or only
incidentally disposed of by the catch-all Dismisso.l
Order. Neither does the Dismissal Order indicate
how the case, as to the $1500.00 policy, deemed at
issue at pretrial, met vrith dismissal summarily.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PRETRIAL ORDER.

As to the $800.00 policy No. 5311848, the same
contains this clause (R 17):
"The insurance upon the life of any employee shall
automatically cease upon the thirty-first day following the termination of his employment with the employer in the specified classes of employees; but in
the case of the termination of the employment for
any reason whatsoever while insured under said
policy, the employee shall be entitled to have issued
to him by the society, without further evidence of
insurability, upon application made to the society
within thirty-one days after such termination and
upon the payment of the premium applicable to the
class of risk to which he belongs and to the form
and amount of the policy at his then attained age, an
individual policy of life insurance in any one of the
forms then customarily issued by the society, except
term insurance, in an amount equal to, or at his
option, less than the amount of his protection under
the group insurance policy at the time of such
termination. Such individual insurance policy shall
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become effective at the end of thirty-one days after
the termination of the employment provided the
premium therefor is paid to the society not later than
such effective date."

Noting the legal question thereby raised, the
Pre-trial Judge (R 41) directed that same be disposed
of by Motion for Summary Judgment. However,
after Plaintiff amended the Complaint as allowed by
the Pre-trial Order, Defendant moved to dismiss and
the record does not reveal whether the question
was specifically considered or only incidentally
disposed of by the Court in granting the Motion to
Dismiss.
In connection with this $800.00 policy, numerous cases hold that one whose employment has
terminated and who dies or becomes disabled within the grace period, is protected, although the policy provides that the insurance shall cease upon the
termination of the employment.
In Powell -vs- Equitable Life Assurance Society,
173 S.C. 50, 174 S.E. 649, it was held where a deceased woman employee had been insured under
a group insurance policy providing for termination
of employment, except that the employer could elect
to consider employees temporarily laid off or temporarily disabled as still employed during such a period, and granting a grace period of thirty-one days
for the payment of the premiums, during which
period the policy was to continue in force, and it
appeared that although the employee was laid off
because of her physical condition on December 10,
1931, the termination date of her insurance was
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filled in on the employer's insurance register as of
February 1, 1932 and that she died on February
27th the same year without having returned to work,
that even though her insurance was terminated
February 1st, she still had insurance protection under the grace provision of the policy and that the
trial Court committed no error in leaving to the jury
the question of employment and in refusing the insurer's motion for non-suit and direction of verdict.
In Equitable Life Assurance Society vs. Hoover.
187 Okla. 134, 101 Pac. 2nd 632, the Court held in
such a policy that the term "grace period" apparently meant period of continuance under a conversion
clause. There the policy provided for termination 0£
insurance on termination of employment and thirtyone days to convert and the Court held that the insurance did not terminate until the end of the thirtyone day grace period although there was, in fact,
in that case, no conversion.
In the instant case there is no thirty-one day
grace period to convert; the actual policy is in force
for thirty-one days; therefore a reasonable time
should be allowed for conversion after the thirtyone day grace period. Decedant died thirty-five days
after the end of the thirty-one day termination period.
In Atlas vs. Miles, 161 Pac 2nd 1022, it was held
that a group policy terminable on termination of employment and thirty-one days conversion period did
not terminate despite the fact of no conversion untll
after the thirty-one day grace period so that there
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was coverage where the insured terminated November 10th and died December 6th.
In Shanks vs. Travelers Insurance Company.
Okla. 25 F Supp. 740, a deceased employee was covered by a group policy and although he had not
exercised his conversion privilege, good for thirtyone days, and died the day following termination,
it was held the deceased was covered by insurance
even though he had not exercised his conversion
privilege.
In the instant case it can be inferred that decedent, had he not been disabled, would have exercised conversion privilege; also that he may have
done so had he been notified or been made knowledgeable of the privilege and also that he had
reasonable time after termination of the policy
which, in turn, terminated thirty-one days following
termination of employment.
In Steiner vs. Travelers Insurance Company.
279 Ill. App. 607, a group insurance policy provided
that coverage thereunder terminated with termination of employment but that temporary layoff or
leave of absence should not be considered as termination unless the employer should so elect; the
employee died six weeks after he was laid off and
while the contract with the employee was in full
force and effect, it was held that the incontestible
provision in the policy imposed on the insurer the
burden of proving that the employment of the deceased had terminated within the provisions of the
policy.
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In the instant case, the Plaintiff came (R 66)
paragraph 6, that decedant was terminated for the
same disability which resulted in his death and
from Defendant's Affidavit (R 57) we are led to believe that termination at best, if not according to
Plaintiff's Complaint, was because decedent told
Larry Blake "Go to hell."
Full discovery not having been completed, the
facts may well disclose decedant was improperly
terminated and that the burden that was as in the
Illinois case on the Defendant to prove that the employment of the deceased employee had terminated
within the provisions of the policy.

1

Travelers Insurance Company vs. Fox. 155 Md.
210, 141 Atl. 547 held that where liability under a
group policy such as this was claimed because 0£ ,
termination, the burden of proving the discharge
was on the insurance company.
Peters vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 27<)
Mich. 663, 273 N.\/\1. 307 holds categorically that the
burden of proof in a policy such as this, where th'?
policy has lapsed by reason of termination of the
employee's employment, is on the insurance company.
In the instant case the Plaintiff alleges that, and
apparently feels that she can prove that insured
was disabled durinq the period in which he was entitled to apply for a converted policy. If so, recovery
in the instant case on the $800.00 policy would undoubtedly be allovved in Oklahoma or Illinois and,
in accordance with the pretrial order of the Cowt
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here the Court should have specifically decided
what the la.w is in Utah.
With respect to the $1500.00 policy, No. 0486-A,
the cause was, at pretrial, at issue with only two
questions to be decided: the adequacy of proof to
the company or waiver of necessity of same, and
secondly, whether the deceased was disabled from
date of termination until date of death, the policy
providing (R-19) that is disability continues from
date of termination until date of death "There shall
be paid to such employee's beneficiary under said
policy the amount of insurance in force thereunder
on the life of such employee at said date ... "
The fact that the Court at pretrial (R-41) allowed
Plaintiff further discovery as to the amount recoverable under the $1500.00 policy, No. 0486-A, did not
change the fact that the case was already at issue
with respect to said policy and the Court's dismissal
of the case as to that policy, along with the $800.00
policy on vvhich there was difficult issues of law,
came as a complete surprise to Plaintiff.

It is the usual ruling that denial of liability by
an insurance company waives necessity of formal
proofs of loss, 22 ALR, 407, Wilkerson vs. Standard
Accident Insurance Company, 180 Calif. 252, 180
Pac. 607. Plaintiff was entitled to assume in view of
the pretrial order that the cause of action as to the
$1500.00 policy was already at issue and that she
need not spell out in detail the denial of liability,
the party denying liability in behalf of the insurance company, the nature of notice given of death
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as set forth in Response to Interrogatories, (R-22) o"the detail as to performance of conditions precedent
to Plaintiff's demands and to Defendant's liability a3
alleged in the Second Amended Complaint {R-66)
or to support the estopple alleged in paragraph 10,
{R-67).
Regarding denial of liability as a waiver of
proofs, 29 A Am. Jur. reads as follows:
Article 1431. Denial of Liability-A denial of liability
of an insurer, made during the period prescribed by
the policy for the presentation of proofs, and on
grounds not relating to the proofs, will ordinarily be
considered a waiver of the provision of the policy requiring the proofs to be presented, or a waiver of the
insufficiency of the proofs or of defects therein. The
denial of liability is equivalent to declaration that
the insurer will not pay although proofs are furnished
in accordance with the policy, and the law will not
require the doing of a vain or useless thing.

The Am. Jur. text cites Stewart vs. Commercial
Insurance Company. 114 Utah 278, 198 Pac. 2nd 467,
a casualty loss case where the foregoing principles
are recited, the head note reading:
"Denial of liability by insurance carrier made, during period prescribed by policy for presentation of
proof or loss, on grounds not relating to proofs wi.ll
ordinarily be considered waiver of provisions of policy
requiring proofs to be presented."

The foregoing Utah Casualty loss case in turn
cites Miller vs. New York Life Insurance Company,
84 Utah 533, 37 Pac. 2nd 547, a life insurance case,
where the Utah Supreme Court, page 549 said:
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"
on the facts found by the jury's verdict, the
company waived further information and formal
proof by reason of its denial of liability and failure
to furnish blank forms." Federal Life Insurance Company vs. Lewis, 76 Olka. 142, 183 Pac. 975, 5 ALR
1637. The rule supported by the weight of authority
is thus stated in 14 RCL 1349: " 'If the insurer refuses to furnish blanks on the grounds that no liability exists, it waives proofs of loss. Where it is customary for the insurer to furnish blanks for proof of loss,
its refusal to do so upon request is a waiver of proof.'"

Had the Interrogatories (R-64) been answered,
the record may well have been made to reveal the
details of notice and denial of liability and the
Jdentity and authority of persons receiving such
notice and their authority in acting for the company
in denying liability.
POINT II
THE COMPLAINT, CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER, STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.

As to the medical and weekly benefit policies,
Nos. 0486-W and 0846-H, set forth in the third and
fourth causes of action, the general allegations in
the Amended Complaint apply, i.e., coverage,
notice, rights as beneficiary, compliance by Plaintiff with conditions precedent and estopple to claim
la_ck of notice etc.
There being no requirement, as for instance
with fraud, for Pleiintiff to particularize in pleading,
a cause of action is stated and in the absence of a
demand, or a requirement by the Court, that Plaint-
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iff particularize on those elements, it is difficult ~rJ
see why the Compla.int was dismissed.
We are brought to the third point and an inquiry as to whether evidentia.ry matters disclosed
in the record warrant dismissal in the nature of ct
Summary Judgment.
POINT III
EVIDENTIARY MATTERS IN THE RECORD DO
NOT SUSTAIN DISMISSAL.

Evidentiary matters in the record consist of the
following: Insurance policies produced (R-12, 13,
43, 44), Affidavit of Larry Blake (R-56), Answering
Affidavit of Plaintiff (R-58), Response to Interrogcttories (R-27 and 28) and the Deposition of Plaintiff.
No aid, of course, is given on the $800.00 policy
question, that being a matter of law.
As to the $1500.00 policy, No. 0486-A remembering there are two questions, submission of Proof
of Death within a year and the matter of total disability from termination of employment until death,
let us examine the evidence for aid. The Interrogatories (R-28) give no aid except the answer that notification of claim was within one week after the
death of Mr. Bench and this aids Plaintiff-not defendant.
The $1500.00 policy on exhibit of course spells
out the requirement of disability from termination
until death. The deposition makes amply clear that
deceased was totally disabled from termination until
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death. A few quotations indicate how positive the
testimony is on this:
(Deposition of Plaintiff. page 8, L 24.)
Q.

So he stayed right in bed from the date he was
terminated until he went out to the County
hospital?

A.

Except when he went for a treatment.

(Deposition page 8, L 19.)
Q.

And between April 26th and the date he went
to the County Hospital was he confined to bed
or was he up and around?

A.

He had to go to bed and have his feet elevated,
his leg.

Q.

Both legs or only one?

A.

Just the one.

(Deposition page 8, L 25.)
Q.

During this period of time, what did your husband do while he was at home? Was he in bed
all of the time?

A.

He would lie around in bed or on the couch. The
doctor told him to stay off it.

(Deposition p. 11, L 30.)
Q.

What was the appearance of it? Was it an open
wound?

A.

It was kind of open wound with stuff all around

Q.

Didn't it appear to improve any with these treatments?

it with red streaks up his leg and down.
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A.

It didn't seem like it was improving as good as
it should.

Q.

You mentioned that he went in the hospital on
the Thursday before July 1st.

A.

Yes.

Q.

He was admitted at that time as a bed patient?
Was he in the hospital?

A.

That is right.

Q.

And didn't ever leave the hospital?

A.

No, not until after death.

(Deposition p. 17, L 9.)
Q.

During the period between April 26 and the
Thursday before July 1st did your husband leave
the house at all except to go to the hospital for
treatment?

A.

Not unless the children came up to see him and
then they would take him to their house for a
little bit, you know. Then he would lay down
on the couch and put his leg up.

Q.

Other than those very short social visits, he
didn't leave the house at all?

A.

No.

Q.

Was he able to walk on that leg?

A.

Limp. It hurt.

(Deposition p. 17, L 25.)
Q.

The morning of the accident do you know
whether there was anything wrong with his leg
when he left for work that day?

A. There wasn't anything wrong with it.
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Q.

What time did he come home that day?

A.

He came home 2:30 A.M.

Q.

Did he show you the leg?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he tell you about the accident?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Describe it.

A.

It is about 2 Y2 inches long. It looks it would be
about between a half inch or three-quarters of
an inch deep. Something like that. It was cut
quite deep.

Q.

Through the skin?

A.

Yes.

(P. 20, L 27.)
Q.

About how long after the accident did he first go
to the hospital?

A.

We couldn't get in until the welfare gave him
permission and ...

(P. 20, L 27.)
Q.

And the progress of the leg between those times
was what? Did he get better or worse or what?

A.

He kept getting worse.

Supplementing the deposition is the Plaintiff's
Affidavit {R-38) that deceased was unable to work,
confined to the house, directed by the doctor to stay
off his feet; that he was continually disabled and ill
from termination of work until death and that the
same condition which disabled him during that pe-
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riod was that which precluded him from continuing
work and was the same that led to his death July
1st.

As against that, we have the Affidavit of Larry
Blake (R-57) where deceased told Larry Blake "Go
to hell," indicatinq that affiant called the doctor's
office-obviously before deceased had seen the
doctor(Deposition p. 18, L 27)
A.

He didn't see Dr. Burnham.

Q.

Did your husband try to contact him?

A.

I tried to call Dr. Burnham's office but couldn't
get an appointment.

Q.

Couldn't get an appointment until when?

A.

She didn't say when.

Q.

Was this on what day? What day of the week?

A.

Monday morning.

Q.

Did he go to work the following day?

A.

No, Sir.

Q.

When did he next go to the plant?

A.

The following Friday ...

(Deposition p. 19, L 20)
Q.

Is that when he got the blue slip?

A.

Yes.,

learned that decedant had not seen the doctor and
concluded he was well. The Affidavit goes on
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"Upon return to Ajax Press Company this Affiant
prepared formal termination notice and to this Affiant's knowledge; Leland Bench did not return to
work after Affiant talked vrith Bench at his home."
On the issue of total disability from termination
until death, said Affidavit (R-57) is quite insignificant
against the overwhelming impact of the wife's delineation by Affidavit and deposition of deceased' s
complete incapacity from termination until death.
Regarding policy No. 0486-W, alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, (R-67) and in the previous Complaint (R-47) no answer has been made and we are
at a loss to know the precise reason for dismissal
as it relates to that certificate.
Regarding certificate No. 0846-H, medical bene£its clause, the applicable responsive material in
the answer (R-53) reads .
8. "That group policy No. 0486-H provides certain
hospital and surgical benefits as scheduled therein, being limited however to not more than the
actual cost incurred by the employee, and further
provides that notice of claim shall be given to the
Defendant within twenty days after the commencement of hospital confinement or operation
and that written proof of confinement and charges
incurred shall be furnished within ninety days
after the expiration of the period of hospital confinement or operation.
9. That no claim has ever been made under the hospital and surp-ical benefit provisions of policy No.
0486-A and the Defendant is informed and upon
such information and belief, alleges that the
Plaintiff did not incur any hospital or surgical
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expense but that in truth and in fact, 'c~c d:ceased was admitted to and treated as a charity
patient at the Salt Lake County Hospital and
therefore the Defendant has no liability to the
Plaintiff under hospital and surgical provisions of
policy No. 0486-A."

We then only have the legal question presented
whether the insurance company can take advantage
of the deceased's entitlement to, and enjoyment of,
treatment at the expense of the county.
(In addition, of course, is the question of notice.
proof and waiver of proof and estopple.)

It is conceded, of ::::ourse, that medical benefits
recovered would be for the benefit of the county.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it would be appropriate for this
Court to make the following Order:

1. Regarding the $800.00 policy No. 5311848,
to squarely decide the legal question referred to in
the pretrial order and in the Illinois and Oklahoma
cases decided in the insured' s favor.
2. Regarding the $1500.00 policy No. 0486-A
setting the case for trial on the issues already joined
at date of pretrial.
3. On the weeklv benefits certificate, setting
the case for trial on the issues of notice, Proof of
Claim, waiver of necessity of Proof of Loss and
estopple.
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4. On the medical payments policy, squarely
deciding the issue of whether Plaintiff is precluded
from recovery by reason of the hospitalization having been paid by the County and reserving for trial
the other issues as with the weekly indemnity certificate.
5. On all factors, allowing further discovery,
including response to the Interrogatories {R-64); that
Plaintiff may show the details of her allegation of
notice, waiver of Proof of Loss and estopple.
Respectfully submitted,
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GAYLE DEAN HUNT,
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
916 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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~ed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Wallace D. Hurd, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, this
15th day of March, 1968.
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